非国有股东治理与国有资本金融稳定——基于股价崩盘风险的视角

Governance of Non-state Shareholders and Financial Stability of State-owned Capital: An Analysis on Stock Price Crash Risk

如何防范系统性金融风险是近年来政府和学界重点关注的问题。文章从股价崩盘风险的视角研究了基于国有企业混合所有制改革的非国有股东治理对国有资本金融稳定的影响。文章以2008-2015年国有上市公司为样本,通过手工收集整理年报中披露的前十大股东性质、持股比例与委派董事的数据,从股权制衡和高层治理两个维度来衡量非国有股东参与国企治理的程度,探究了其对股价崩盘风险的影响。研究发现,非国有股东仅持有股权难以发挥实质性治理作用,而当委派董事参与国有企业高层治理时,可以有效缓解代理问题和改善信息透明度,进而降低国有企业股价崩盘风险。非国有股东降低国有企业股价崩盘风险的作用在国有企业内部管理者权力弱以及处于竞争性行业时更加显著。文章揭示了混合所有制改革促进国有资本金融稳定的一条可能路径,并丰富了非国有股东治理和股价崩盘风险的相关学术研究。

How to better utilize market mechanisms to ensure the stability of Chinese financial system and prevent financial risks under the new development pattern of Chinese expanding financial opening to the outside world has become an extremely important research topic at the national governance level.In the context of the mixed ownership reform,non-state shareholders can better participate in the governance of stateowned enterprises and alleviate the principal-agent problem,thereby reducing the risk of state-owned enterprise stock price crash risk and maintaining the financial stability of state-owned capital.On this foundation,our paper uses the data of state-owned listed companies from 2008 to 2015 as a sample,and manually sorts out the data on the nature of the top ten shareholders,shareholding ratios,and directors appointed by shareholders in the annual report,so as to study the impact of the governance of non-state shareholders on stock price crash risk among state-owned enterprises from the dimensions of equity balance and high-level governance.It finds that it is difficult for non-state shareholders to play a governance role only by holding equity.And only when non-state shareholders appoint directors to participate in the high-level governance of state-owned enterprises,can they effectively alleviate agency problems and improve information transparency,thereby reducing the stock price crash risk of state-owned enterprises.Further research shows that the aforementioned effect is more prominent in state-owned enterprises with low internal management power and competitive industries.Our paper mainly has the following two policy recommendations.On the one hand,it supports the policy spillover effect of state-owned enterprise mixed ownership reform in maintaining the security and stability of Chinese financial market.That is,non-state shareholders appointing directors to state-owned enterprises can reduce the stock price crash risk of state-owned enterprises and maintain the stability of their market value without losing the controlling rights of state-owned shareholders or causing the loss of state-owned assets.Thus,the national leader can pay more attention to the supporting guarantee system for non-state shareholders to appoint directors to state-owned enterprises in the future mixed ownership reform.On the other hand,this paper finds a path for how to effectively prevent and resolve financial risks.Under the realistic environment where the stock market is an important part of Chinese financial system and stateowned listed companies are the mainstay of Chinese stock market,it is possible to effectively ensure that nonstate shareholders who are more concerned about the stock price of state-owned enterprises nominate and appoint directors to state-owned listed companies.This will not only help to alleviate the stock price crash risk of state-owned enterprises and maintain the stability of the market value of state-owned listed companies,but also help to maintain the stability and security of Chinese stock market and even the entire financial system.