慈善捐赠、公司治理与上市公司投资-现金流敏感性

Corporate Philanthropy, Corporate Governance and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity

基于中国上市公司数据,探讨企业慈善捐赠与投资-现金流敏感性之间的关系。研究发现:慈善捐赠能够通过优化外部融资环境缓解投资-现金流敏感性,但由于慈善捐赠同时也带来了更严重的委托代理问题,缓解作用仅存在于有良好内部监督治理机制的公司里。更进一步地,研究发现捐赠效应的发挥受制于一定边界条件,当企业处于低风险时,慈善捐赠的缓解效应较为显著,而企业处于高风险时,效应则不显著,这说明捐赠效应具有一定的主体依赖性。此外,通过验证慈善捐赠潜在的负面效应,发现慈善捐赠带来了更多委托代理问题,在慈善捐赠水平较高的企业里,过度投资、费用管理松弛以及管理者高薪等代理问题也更为严重。

Although it has been evidenced that corporate donation can optimize financing conditions for firms,the impact could be limited in the firms with bad corporate governance and high risk.Based on the Chinese listed firms,we investigated the relationship between corporate donation and investment-cash flow sensitivity.We find that corporate donation can significantly moderate the degree of investment-cash flow sensitivity through creating a friendlier financing conditions,while we only obtain this result in the samples with good corporate governance.Further,we find that the relationship between corporate donation and investment-cash flow sensitivity is weakened when the firm is in high risk.It indicates that the effectiveness of the strategy of corporate donation depends on the operation performance of the particular firm.Finally,as it is conjected that corporate philanthropy also could bring more agency problem,we find a positive relationship between donation and various of consequences related with agency problem,such as overinvest,more SG&A and higher compensation for top managers.