摘要
长期以来中国承担着其他国家大量的外包任务,而较少关注本土制造业企业主导的外包行为。本文基于中国企业在离岸外包时与供应商的契约摩擦,结合交易成本理论和产权理论扩展了一个不完全契约的企业外包模型,研究契约效率对异质性企业外包决策的影响及契约效率的内生性来源,并用2000—2007年中国制造业企业的数据进行实证检验。结果发现:契约效率不足时,企业外包要求的临界生产率比契约效率充足时更高,且生产率对企业在外国的外包份额的影响会降低;契约效率的提升能显著提高企业在外国的外包份额,且用工具变量法控制了内生性后结论依然稳健。中国制造业企业的检验数据表明,企业总部密集度中只有资本密集度对外包份额有显著影响,且增加企业的资本密集度和产品的消费替代弹性能提高它与供应商博弈时的主导地位。本文的研究有助于中国制造业企业在面对契约效率不足时合理布局外包策略,优化自身的全球价值链体系。
For a long time,China has mainly focused on offshoring for other countries and paid less attention to offshoring led by local manufacturing enterprises.Based on the contract friction between Chinese enterprises and suppliers in offshoring,this paper presented an enterprise offshoring model of incomplete contracts in combination with transaction cost theory and property right theory.Moreover,the impact of contract efficiency on the offshoring decision of heterogeneous enterprises and the endogenous sources of contract efficiency were studied,and an empirical test was conducted with the data of Chinese manufacturing enterprises from 2000 to 2007.The results show that when the contract efficiency is low,the threshold productivity required by offshoring enterprises is higher than when the contract efficiency is high,and the impact of productivity on offshoring share of enterprises in foreign countries is lower.The improvement of contract efficiency can significantly increase the offshoring share of enterprises in foreign countries.This conclusion is still tenable after the endogeneity is controlled with the instrumental variable method.The test data of Chinese manufacturing enterprises also show that only the capital intensity in the enterprise headquarter intensity has a significant impact on offshoring share.Increasing the capital intensity of enterprises and consumption elasticity of substitution between products can improve the enterprises’dominant position in the game with suppliers.The research of this paper is helpful for Chinese manufacturing enterprises to design rational offshoring strategies and to optimize their own system of global value chain when the contract efficiency is insufficient.
作者
徐海波
冯德连
邢孝兵
XU Haibo;FENG Delian;XING Xiaobing
出处
《国际贸易问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2021年第1期31-49,共19页
Journal of International Trade
基金
安徽省高等学校自然科学重点项目“不完全契约下中国制造业企业对外外包决策研究”(KJ2020A0003)
关键词
契约效率
异质性企业
外包
全球价值链
Contract Efficiency
Heterogeneous Enterprise
Offshoring
Global Value Chain