基于反垄断威慑和平抑视角的最优合谋罚款研究

On the Optimal Cartel Fines: Stability vs. Competitiveness of Collusive Behavior

在反垄断执法实践中,合谋罚款作为规制企业合谋的重要手段,不仅直接降低企业合谋的预期收益,还会降低合谋稳定性,间接影响内生合谋程度。本文通过建立动态合谋理论模型,探讨不同罚款模式包括罚款基数与罚款期限等对合谋稳定性和程度的影响,进而比较提出最优罚款模式。研究发现:合谋罚款通常可以降低合谋稳定性,形成合谋威慑,但可能诱发内生合谋程度加剧,不利于平抑合谋程度。综观不同罚款模式,当罚款额相同时,定额罚款的合谋威慑效应总是强于利润和销售额比例罚款。利润比例罚款的合谋威慑效应虽然弱于定额罚款,但可以相对缓和内生合谋程度。销售额比例罚款除诱使卡特尔进一步降低合谋产量以减轻罚款之外,甚至可能促进合谋稳定。针对多期合谋,较长的基础罚款额核算期限有助于提升罚款的合谋威慑力。本文建议反垄断执法机构采用定额罚款和利润比例罚款相结合的组合罚款模式规制合谋行为,充分发挥合谋罚款的威慑作用,谨防罚款引发合谋程度加剧。同时,应根据实际合谋期,适当延长基础罚款额核算期限,加大对持续期长、重复多次的合谋行为的处罚力度,构建合谋罚款威慑的长效机制。

Cartel fines are important means to regulate collusion between firms.Fines not only directly reduce the expected profit of collusion,but also reduce the stability of collusion and indirectly affect the degree of endogenous collusion.This article establishes a theoretical model for dynamic collusion.It compares the impact of different fine models—including the base and duration of fines—on the stability and degree of collusion and then proposes the optimal fine model.The article finds that fines can usually reduce the stability of collusion and,thus,deter it,but they may induce an increase in the degree of endogenous collusion,which is not conducive to suppressing the degree of collusion.Throughout different fine models,when the fines are the same,the collusion deterrence of fixed fines is always stronger than that of proportional fines based on profits and sales.Although proportional fines based on profits have a weaker deterrent effect than fixed fines,they can ease the degree of endogenous collusion.In addition to inducing cartels to further reduce collusion in order to avoid fines,proportional fines based on sales may even stabilize collusion.Regarding the duration for determining the base of the fine,the longer duration,the stronger the deterrent effect of the fine.The results indicate that,to deter collusion,the antimonopoly authority could design a model with a combination of fixed fines and proportional fines based on profits.Meanwhile,according to the actual duration of collusion,other actions including extending the duration for determining the base of fine appropriately,increasing the fines for long-lasting and repeated collusion,and constructing a long-term cartel fine deterring mechanism,should be taken into consideration.