基于主从博弈的储能电站容量电费定价方法

Subsidy Pricing Method for Stackelberg-game-based Energy Storage System

储能系统的规模化应用是提高新能源消纳能力的重要手段之一,其大规模推广需要容量电价激励。然而,现有的容量电价计算方法仅与建设成本相关,收益固定,不利于调动储能电站的运行积极性。因此,提出了一种基于主从博弈的储能容量电费定价方法,同时计及了储能电站和电网的收益,储能电站作为领导者根据容量电费信号决定建设容量,电网作为跟随者依据储能容量调整容量电费,两者交互影响,直至实现均衡。在此基础上,将该博弈问题转化为双层规划问题进行求解,上层目标为储能电站收益最大化,下层目标为电网补贴成本最小化。进一步,通过Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)最优性条件,将双层规划问题转化为可直接求解的混合整数规划问题。最后,通过仿真算例验证所提方法的合理性和有效性。结果表明,主从博弈定价的方法可以有效模拟电网和电站直接的互动决策关系,保障储能电站容量电费定价的合理性。和传统方法相比,本方法在实现新能源消纳目标的同时降低了电网对储能的补贴成本。

The large-scale application of energy storage is an important method to achieve the renewable energy consumption targets,and its promotion relies on capacity subsidy incentives.However,the capacity subsidy solely depends on capital costs,and the income is fixed,which cannot arouse the project’s initiative.Therefore,we propose a method for setting capacity subsidy based on Stackelberg game,which compromises the interests of both sides.The energy storage plant,as a leader of the game,formulates its capacity strategy according to capacity subsidy signals.The grid company,as a follower,adjusts capacity subsidy based on storage plant’s decision.The Stackelberg game is modeled as a bi-level optimization problem where storage plant seeks to maximize profit and grid company seek to minimize overall cost.The problem can be transformed to a mixed integer programming problem through the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)optimal condition,which can be directly solved by commercial software.Computational examples are presented to reveal the rationality and effectiveness of the proposed model and method.The results show that the proposed method can effectively simulate the decision-making interplay between the power grid and the power station,and guarantee the rationality of the capacity subsidy.Compared with the conventional method,the proposed method can achieve energy consumption targets while reducing the subsidy cost of the grid.