政府补贴政策对可持续供应链决策的影响

The Influence of Government Subsidy Policies on Sustainable Supply Chain Decision-making

针对一个承担企业社会责任的制造商和n个零售商组成的二级供应链,分别建立了无政府补贴和有政府补贴下制造商主导的可持续供应链Stackelberg博弈模型。分析企业社会责任及政府补贴对供应链成员决策、供应链成员利润和社会福利的影响,探讨政府的最优补贴策略。研究结果表明,无论是否有政府补贴,随着制造商企业社会责任成本系数的增加,企业社会责任水平、零售商利润、制造商利润和社会福利都会下降;在一定范围内提升企业社会责任水平,有利于提升供应链成员利润,但超过一定限额会使得制造商利润和社会福利下降;与无政府补贴的情况相比,政府补贴可以提高供应链的整体绩效和社会福利,但过度补贴会导致社会福利下降。

Considering a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer with corporate social responsibility and n retailers,this paper establishes two sustainable supply chain Stackelberg game models for manufacturer-dominated with or without government subsidies.This paper analyzes the impact of corporate social responsibility and government subsidies on supply chain member decision-making,supply chain members’profits and social welfare,and determine the optimal government subsidy ratio.The research results show that,with or without government subsidies,as the corporate social responsibility cost factor increases,the level of corporate social responsibility efforts,retailer profits,manufacturer profits and the level of social welfare will decline.Enhancing the level of corporate social responsibility within a certain scope is conducive to improving the profits of the supply chain members,but exceeding a certain limit will reduce the manufacturer’s profit and social welfare.Compared with the situation of no-government subsidies,government subsidies can improve the overall performance of the supply chain and social welfare,improve the overall performance of the supply chain and improve social welfare,but excessive government subsidies will lead to a decline in social welfare.