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基于信号成本视角的P2P借贷平台信息认证机制研究

Research on Information Authentication Mechanism of P2P Lending Platform Based on Signal Cost Perspective
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摘要 信息认证机制是P2P借贷平台降低信用风险、促进合规交易的关键举措.交易前信息认证审核与交易中信息认证评价既是影响交易结果的重要环节,也是出借人决策的主要依据.本文分析并实证检验了平台实施上述举措的效果,第一,通过建立信号博弈模型,证明信息认证审核是影响博弈均衡和借贷结果的重要因素,并发现平台对信息认证审核效果较好;第二,基于拍拍贷平台的真实交易数据,通过计量模型分析,实证检验了信号博弈模型的分析结论,并揭示平台信息认证评价效果较差.研究结论表明:平台应在加大信息认证审核力度的基础上,提高信息认证评价质量,区分不同信息认证的信号成本,客观反映借款人信用状况,引导出借人理性投资.本文的研究工作:(1)丰富了信息认证机制的理论研究成果,论证了信息认证对借贷交易的影响;(2)探讨了P2P借贷平台信用评价方式的缺陷,对平台规范信息认证体系,避免出借人蒙受损失,降低P2P借贷信用风险具有现实意义. Information authentication in P2P lending is the key to reduce credit risk and Promote transaction.The information certification before the transaction and the information evaluation during the transaction is the key to influence the transaction result and the imPortant basis of the lender's decision.The imPlementation of the two asPects above is analyzed and tested in this PaPer.First we establish a signaling game model and econometrics model,Prove that the information certification is an imPortant factor affecting the game equilibrium and transaction results,which is well imPlemented by Platforms.Second we Prove bad effect of information evaluation by econometric model.We argue that the Platform should not only increase information certification efforts but also imProve the information evaluation,differentiate the cost of signal among different authentication information,objectively reflect the credit status of the borrower and guide rational investment for lenders.This PaPer enriches the theory related information authentication mechanism,exPlains the influence of information authentication on lending transactions and discusses the shortcomings of information authentication in P2P lending Platforms.This PaPer helPs to standardize the information authentication system,avoid loss of lenders and reduce credit risk in the view of Practical significance.
作者 涂艳 王翔宇 TU Yan;WANG Xiang-yu(School of Information,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处 《中国软科学》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2019年第S01期270-281,共12页 China Soft Science
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“P2P网络借贷主体决策行为与风险防控策略研究”(15YJAZH066).
关键词 P2P借贷 信息认证 信号博弈 违约风险 P2P lending information authentication signaling game theory default risk
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