基于信号博弈的民用运力征用补偿决策

Compensation Decision of Civil Transportation Capacity Expropriation Based on Signal Game

针对当前我国民用运力征用补偿存在的补偿标准原则性多、没有区分使用环境和运力质量、经费补偿效益不高等问题,尝试用信号博弈的方法建立模型,解决运力类型识别、筛选以及经费补偿决策的适用环境等问题.进行民用运力征用补偿问题博弈分析;利用不完全信息动态博弈方法建立信号博弈模型,对征用主体和征用对象的效用进行求解,得出双方的贝叶斯子博弈精炼纳什均衡空间;对不同均衡的适用环境进行分析,指出征用补偿决策的实现路径.研究发现:民用运力征用补偿博弈受伪装成本和边际效用等因素影响,存在两种“分离均衡”和3种“混同均衡”.

In view of the problems existing in current compensation standards for civil transportation capacity expropriation, such as many principles, no distinction between the use environment and transportation capacity quality, and low efficiency of fund compensation, this paper tries to establish a model by using signal game method to solve the problems of transportation capacity type identification, screening and the applicable environment for fund compensation decision. It firstly carries out the game analysis of civil transportation capacity expropriation compensation. Then, it establishes signal game model by using incomplete information dynamic game method to solve the utility of expropriation subject and expropriation object, and obtains the Bayesian sub game refining Nash equilibrium space of both sides. Finally, it analyzes the applicable environment of different equilibrium and points out the realization path of expropriation compensation decision. The study shows that there are two kinds of "separate equilibrium" and three kinds of "mixed equilibrium" in the compensation game of civil transportation capacity expropriation, which are affected by camouflage cost and marginal utility.