CEO会利用多个大股东“制衡”从中获利吗？——来自CEO超额薪酬的经验证据

Will CEOs Profit from Multiple Major Shareholders’ Equity Balance? Empirical Evidence from CEO Overcompensation

本文利用我国2007—2016年A股上市公司数据对多个大股东与CEO超额薪酬的关系进行实证检验,得到的研究结论如下:第一,公司存在多个大股东与CEO超额薪酬存在正相关关系,并且股东力量越平衡,超额薪酬水平越高;第二,公司存在不同产权类型的大股东时,CEO超额薪酬水平越高,并且不同性质的大股东的制衡力量越接近,超额薪酬越高.但是,第一大股东更高的持股水平反而有利于抑制CEO获得超额薪酬;第三,公司盈余管理行为、关系大股东的存在导致CEO获取了更高的薪酬;第四,公司大股东产权类型不同或公司存在关系大股东时,CEO薪酬业绩敏感性下降,是CEO获得超额薪酬的重要条件.大股东数目增加导致彼此协调难度加大,容易被高管加以利用,关系大股东容易导致互相勾结,使得股权制衡和监督失效,高管利用大股东冲突或者参与关系大股东的利益联盟获得超额薪酬.

This paper analyzes the cost of the corporate governance of multiple major shareholders from the perspective of executive overcompensation.Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2016,this paper conducts an empirical study on the relationship between the governance of multiple major shareholders and the excess remuneration of CEOs.Firstly,in our country,the ownership structure of listed companies is more centralized,which provides more abundant observation samples for the study of the potential negative impact of the governance of multiple major shareholders.The research finds that the excess CEO compensation of listed companies is positively correlated with the checks and balances of major shareholders and many major shareholders.Secondly,our government continues to promote the reform of mixed ownership and encourage the coexistence of various economic components of ownership.It is a common phenomenon for listed companies to have both state-owned shares and private shares.This paper finds that when there are many large shareholders of different nature,CEOs’salary level is higher,and when the two different kinds of shareholding power are equal,CEOs’salary is higher.Thirdly,existing studies have found that the existence of large shareholders may lead to the failure of the supervision mechanism,which has a serious impact on the company’s business decision-making.This paper finds that earnings management behavior and the existence of large shareholders lead to more compensation for CEOs and the increase of the agency cost of executives.The contributions of this paper lie in three aspects:Firstly,this paper provides a more comprehensive understanding of the role of multiple major shareholders in corporate governance.Secondly,this paper will help to provide reference for the analysis of potential advantages and disadvantages of mixed ownership reform and diversification of corporate governance.Thirdly,from the perspective of the relationship between major shareholders and interest collusion,this paper provides a relevant basis for the improvement of the corporate governance mechanism of multiple major shareholders.