统一价格份额拍卖中的报价策略研究

A research on bidding strategies in uniform-price share auctions

为研究投标人的报价策略对拍卖价格的影响,文章在统一价格份额拍卖的分析框架内建立了投标报价策略与拍卖抑价的关系模型.通过求解出一类新的线性均衡报价策略,并与现有文献所研究的非线性均衡报价策略进行比较,文章证明了在投标人风险中性假设下,线性均衡策略要严格优于非线性均衡策略;同时,由于线性平衡策略的引入,文章还将投标人可以通过需求隐藏提高拍卖抑价的结论推广到了风险规避的情形,从而为进一步研究抑价均衡的消除建立了一个完备的理论基础.

A model of bidding strategies and auction underpricing was established in order to understand their relations in the uniform-price share auctions.By working out a new kind of linear equilibrium bidding strategy and comparing with the non-linear equilibrium bidding strategy that discussed by current literatures,a conclusion was proved that the non-linear bidding strategy is dominated by linear bidding strategy when bidders are risk neutral.Furthermore due to introducing the linear equilibrium bidding strategy,the conclusion that concealing demand can!increase auction underpricing was extend in the case of risk aversion.So this asticle established a complete foundation for further research on underpricing equilibriums elimination.