国有产权制度下资本市场对国企经理约束机制的无效性

Ineffectiveness of the Constraint Mechanism Imposed by Capital Market on Managers of SOEs under State Ownership

国有产权制度与私有产权制度最根本的区别不在于国有资产无法从法律上界定清楚,而在于国有资产的所有者不具有行为能力,国有资产无法找到可追溯的自然人。因此,股票市场发挥约束作用是靠股东“用脚投票”,而这样的退出机制在国有产权制度下无法实施;债券市场的作用机制在于债务合同的双方是独立的产权主体,债权人的威胁是可置信的,而在国有产权制度下,破产机制所产生的威胁不可置信。因此,资本市场在国有产权制度下无法有效约束国有企业经理。

The fundamental difference between state and private ownership is not that state ownership cannot be defined clearly by law,but that there is no available legal representative for state assets,whose owners do not have behavioral ability.As a result,the constraint role played by stock market depends on 'voting with foot',but this kind of exit mechanism cannot be enforced under state ownership.The operating mechanism by stock market depends on the credibility of bankruptcy and the fact that the two parties of the debt contract are independent subjects of title.The bankruptcy threat,however,is not credible for SOE managers under state ownership,which renders the effective constraint of those managers impossible.