论商业银行对信贷客户经理的激励机制——对代理人监测指标的选择和长期激励目标的实现

On Incentive Contracts for Client Managers in Banks——The Choice of Performance Measurement and the Realization of Long-term Incentive Contract

商业银行很难观测自身总收益,因而无法将总收益表示为代理人工作努力程度的函数。作为一种激励机制,存款数量经常被用作对代理人的监控指标,但该指标是无效的。在尝试对信贷客户经理施行模拟利润考核的创新机制前提下,商业银行应建立以风险调整的资本收益率为核心的考核体系,以实现长期激励。

Banks are hardly to evaluate their own total profits,therefore it is unable to use the total profits as the function to assess the efforts made by agents.As an incentive contract,the deposits amount is usually treated as the agents performance measurement which is invalid however.With the creative system,in order to evaluate the client managers by simulant profit,banks should establish a merit system centralizing on the risk adjusted return of capital so that they could achieve the long-term incentives.