我国上市公司高管变更与业绩敏感性研究被引量：3

Top Executive Turnover and the Sensitivity of Turnover to Performance in Chinese Listed Firms

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摘要本文考察了中国上市公司高管变更与绩效敏感性的影响因素。研究发现,高管变更的可能性与公司会计业绩显著负相关,特别是用经行业调整并剔出盈余管理后资产报酬率计量公司业绩时,其负相关关系更加显著。高管变更的可能性还受到第一大股东类型、股权制衡度、高管来源、董事长与总经理两职合一的影响。当公司第一大股东的相对控制权越大,且公司股价在股票市场表现不好时,其董事长被更换的可能性也就越高。非国有企业更有可能采用公司的真实业绩来考核董事长,并在公司业绩不好时撤换董事长,而来源于公司第一大股东或上市公司实际控制人单位的董事长会设法保住自己的地位,以降低公司业绩不好时被变更的可能性。 This paper studies the determinants of top executive turnover and the sensitivity of turnover to performance in Chinese listed Firms.We find that,top executive turnover is significantly and inversely related to firm′s accounting performance especially when we use industry-adjusted and earnings management released return on asset to measure firm performance.The type of the largest shareholder,the degree of equity restriction,the origin of top executive and the duality of director and CEO will also have an im...

作者姬美光王克明

机构地区吉林大学商学院中山大学管理学院

出处《嘉应学院学报》 2008年第1期56-63,共8页 Journal of Jiaying University

关键词高管变更公司业绩管理者堑壕 top executive turnover firm performance management entrenchment

分类号 F83 [经济管理—金融学]

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