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一种认证安全性的分析与设计逻辑 被引量:1

An Analysis and Design Logic for Authentication Security
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摘要 针对BAN逻辑的局限性,在BSW逻辑的基础上,提出了一种针对认证安全性的分析与设计逻辑.同时,以Needham-Schroeder公钥协议及X.509三消息协议的分析与再设计为例,证明了该逻辑的正确性和有效性. To improve the BAN (Burrows, Abadi & Needham)logic, an analysis and design logic for authentication security was proposed based on the BSW (Buttyan, Staamann & Wilhelm) logic. The analysis and re-design for Needham-Schroeder public key protocols and three-message X.509 protocol shows its correctness and effectiveness.
出处 《上海交通大学学报》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2004年第z1期174-177,共4页 Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
基金 国家高技术研究发展计划(863)项目资助(2001AA142160 2002AA145090)
关键词 安全协议 BAN逻辑 形式化方法 security protocols BAN(Burrows, Abadi & Needham) logic formal methods
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参考文献7

  • 1[1]Burrows M, Abadi M, Needham R. A logic of authentication[J]. ACM Transaction on Computer Systems, 1990, 8 (1): 18-36.
  • 2[2]Heintze N, Tygar J. A model for secure protocols and their compositions [A]. Proceedings of the 1994IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy[C]. Oakland, CA: IEEE Computer Society Press, 1994. 2-13.
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同被引文献6

  • 1BUTTYAN L, STAAMANN S, and WIHELM U. A simple logic for authentication protocol design[A]. In Proceedings of the IEEE CS Computer Security Foundations Workshop,Massachusetts, U. S. A, IEEE Computer Society Press, 1998:153-162.
  • 2CHOI Hyun-Jin. Security protocol design by composition[D].Cambridge, United Kingdoms University of Cambridge, 2006.
  • 3GUTTMAN J. Security protocol design via authentication tests[A]. In Proceedings of 15th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, IEEE Computer Society Press, 2002:92-103.
  • 4SONG D. An Automatic Approach for Building Secure Systems[D]. California, U.S. A: Unlversity of California, 2002.
  • 5LOWE G. Breaking and fixing the Necdham-Schroeder publickey protocol using FDR [A]. In Proceedings of TACAS.Passau, Germany, Springer Verlag, 1996: 147-166.
  • 6季庆光,冯登国.关于“为设计认证协议的一个简明逻辑”一文的注记(英文)[J].软件学报,2001,12(11):1581-1585. 被引量:1

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