摘要
针对食品加工行业的商品信用发生机理进行研究,运用产业经济学以及制度经济学的相关分析方法,分别从行业特性和产品特性角度来分析食品加工企业违背产品质量信用的内在动机与外在激励。运用契约理论对加工食品质量失信深入分析,对于不同的产品特性分别运用不同的契约安排来解决其商品信用危机。通过分析南京冠生园制假售假而破产的案例,进一步验证了对食品加工业商品信用发生机理的论证。
This article explores the forming-mechanism of commodity credibility adopting the analytical methods of Industrial Economics and Institutional Economics. In views of industry and product specificities , it analyzes the intra - motive and extra - incentive which cause the food-processing firms to ignore commodity qualities. Based on the Contract Theory, it is argued that different kinds of contractual arrangements can be available to solve the crisis of commodity credibility according to its own specificities. Finally, analyzing the case of Guanshengyuan in Nanjing, which bankrupted because of selling fake moon-cake, it testifies the demonstration on the forming-mechanism of commodity credibility.
出处
《华南农业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2003年第z1期123-129,共7页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
商品信用
食品加工业
产品属性
commodity credibility
food-processing industry
product specificity