用债务期限结构显示企业质量

The Determination of Debt Maturity as a Signal

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摘要本文建立了连续情形下企业债务期限结构选择的博弈模型.债务期限结构能够作为有关企业质量的信号发送给银行,分离均衡的结果表明高质量的企业将选择更高比例的短期债务作为信号以区别于低质量的企业.

作者雷森李传昭

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2003年第z1期451-453,共3页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

关键词信号传递债务期限分离均衡

参考文献5

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中国管理科学

2003年第z1期

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