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锦标激励的理论评述与应用 被引量:2

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摘要 经济学家认为薪酬和晋升能够对代理人努力产生强激励作用,同时还可以减少偷懒和搭便车行为。锦标赛理论就是运用博弈论的方法研究了委托代理关系,本文就是对锦标赛理论进行了评述,研究薪酬差距对在现实公司激励中的应用。
作者 郑芳
机构地区 温州大学商学院
出处 《科技资讯》 2008年第7期178-179,共2页 Science & Technology Information
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共引文献31

同被引文献32

  • 1黄文彦,蓝海林.委托代理关系中激励机制的设计[J].华南理工大学学报(社会科学版),2005,7(1):34-37. 被引量:27
  • 2陈震,张鸣.高管层内部的级差报酬研究[J].中国会计评论,2006,4(1):15-28. 被引量:86
  • 3周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007,42(7):36-50. 被引量:5464
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