基于委托-代理的科层边界及激励机制研究

Hierarchical boundary and incentive mechanismbased on principle-agent theory

近20年来,委托-代理理论试图对科层内的激励问题进行描述,并已取得了大量的研究成果。然而,委托-代理理论很少涉及科层内部组织问题,更没有涉及科层边界确定问题。基于委托-代理理论,通过对委托人和代理人不同行为方式的比较,讨论了科层的边界及激励问题;将委托人收益最大化作为目标函数,证明了科层中当代理人不存在败德行为时,委托人的最优策略为拓展科层边界,即雇佣更多的生产人员;当代理人存在败德行为时,由于委托人的有限监督程度,委托人的最优策略是雇佣经营人员对生产人员进行监督。

In the last twenty years, principle-agent theory has tried to describe the problems of the incentive, and obtained some production. But this theory failed in solving the problems of hierarchical interior organization and hierarchical boundary. This paper discusses hierarchical boundary and incentive-mechanism on principle-agent theory by comparing various behavioral ways between the principle and the agents. It proves that the principle is better off extending hierarchical boundary if the agents have no moral hazard, namely hiring more production workers, and hiring managers as supervisors in many cases even under the existence of the moral hazard at all levels because of the principle's limited supervision degree.