中央银行独立性、责任性与通货膨胀目标制

Independence, Accountability and Inflation Targeting of the Central Bank

近年来不少学者提出,我国货币政策应转向通货膨胀目标制。我国现行的政策实际上正是一种隐性的通货膨胀目标制,20世纪90年代以来所发生的几次通货膨胀偏倚很大程度上是由于央行的独立性不够。鉴于通货膨胀目标制并不能解决当前我国货币政策调控中的问题并可能带来更多的问题,今后货币政策改革应坚持由直接调控向间接调控、由数量型调控向价格型调控的转变思路,在提高央行独立性的同时,增强其责任性并提高货币政策的透明度。

Recently,many scholars bring out that China s monetary policy should be shifted to the inflation targeting.Acually,China s current policy is a hidden system of inflation targeting,several inflation biases since 1990 s is largely due to the cen-tral bank s less independence.In view of the inflation targeting will not solve China s current monetary problem and may create more problems,future reform should insist on heading for indirect regulation,transferring from quantity-oriented tools to price-oriented too...