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金融控股公司的激励约束机制研究 被引量:1

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摘要 本文引入声誉机制,重点研究分析在政府任命及市场选择两种机制并由此出现双重博弈情况下,我国国有金融控股(集团)公司激励约束机制的设计与政策建议。
出处 《经济论坛》 2009年第5期80-82,共3页 Economic Forum
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