论我国国有企业委托代理关系的特点及对策

CharactEristic and Countermeasure about Agency by Agreement of China’s National Enterprise

我国国有企业改革的难点问题之一是国有资产出资人不到位和出资人对经营者的激励约束机制不到位,委托代理关系矛盾复杂。本文拟运用委托代理理论的基本框架,分析我国国有企业委托代理关系的特点及其弊端,并在此基础上提出解决国有企业委托代理关系矛盾,进而提高企业效率的对策。

A difficult problem about reformation on China’s state-owned enterprise is the investor of state-owned asset default, the investor’s encouragement and restriction on operator default, and principal-agent crisscross is complex. This paper, by means of principal-agent theory, analyzed its characteristic and abuse in China and pointed out the countermeasures to enhance the efficiency of enterprise.