摘要
全流通改革第二轮试点已经结束,多数公司的全流通对价方案都大致收敛于十送三,但只有清华同方的方案被否决。对于非流通股股东到底应该支付多少对价,有关各方仍处于各种朦胧的概念与模型当中,目前还不存在一个统一的标准。但可以肯定的是,全流通是一个博弈的过程,最终的对价方案取决于流通股股东与非流通股股东博弈的结果。通过分析全流通博弈双方的效用函数和既定的博弈规则构建全流通对价问题的博弈模型,可以分析博弈双方效用最大化来计算最优对价支付率。该对价支付率可以用于指导非流通股股东制定对价方案,并可以帮助流通股股东判断对价方案的合理性。
The second round experiment of the complete liquidity reformation has been finished.The consideration schemes of most public companies focused on sending 3 shares per 10 shares,but only the scheme of Tsinghua Tongfang was voted down finally.As to how much consideration illiquid share holders should pay on earth,the interested parties are still beset with various dim concepts and models,have not a unified standard at present.However,it is affirmed that the final consideration scheme lies in the game results of liquid share holders and illiquid share holders.Through analyzing the complete liquidity game's both goal utility functions and the fixed game rule to build a game model on consideration issue of complete liquidity,the problem of the maximum utility of the two parties of game can be solved so as to get the optimum consideration payment ration.The optimum consideration payment ratio can be used for guiding the non-negotiable stock shareholders and making consideration schemes,and can also help the common share holders to estimate the rationality of consideration schemes.
出处
《大连理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2006年第2期42-46,共5页
Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
全流通
对价
博弈模型
最优对价支付率
complete liquidity
consideration
game model
optimal consideration payment ratio