摘要
现代经济学的一项重大发展是由传统的完备契约理论转向不完备契约理论。作为一种契约的组织内人工设计的激励契约也必然是不完备的。行动与结果关系的不确定性问题以及产品质量考核等问题,都会造成组织内人工设计的激励契约不完备。激励契约的不完备性必然导致激励契约执行过程中的机会主义行为、“敲竹杠”与资产专用性以及法庭执行困难。这是我们在设计和执行激励契约时应该慎重考虑的问题。
It is a great development that modern economics has transformed from conventional completive contract theory to incomplete contract theory.As a kind of contracts,due to the uncertainty of action-outcome relationship and quality confirmation,artificially-designed incentive contracts are incomplete.The incompletion of incentive contracts leads to the opportunistic behavior,extortion and asset specificity,judicial executing difficulty.We should focus our attention on these problems carefully when we design and execute incentive contracts in organization.
出处
《大连理工大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第3期28-33,共6页
Journal of Dalian University of Technology(Social Sciences)
关键词
激励契约
不完备性
履约障碍
incentive contract
incompletion
executing difficulty
