中小企业与金融中介在债务融资中的博弈分析——中小企业融资难的另一新解释

Game analysis of small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) and financial intermediaries in the debt financing——Another new explanation for the difficult financing of SMEs

针对中小企业融资难的问题,定性分析金融中介与中小企业债务契约的特征,运用一个简单模型,在中小企业隐瞒信息的特殊偏好、运营绩效对企业主个人特征等无形资产过分依赖等契约特征条件下,定量研究中小企业与金融中介在债务融资中的行为和规律。结果表明中小企业融资难与破产清算价值和清算概率密切相关,二者又取决于契约特征:运营绩效对企业主个人特征依赖性强、资产互补性强,是造成中小企业破产清算价值低的主要因素;同时,当中小企业出现流动性风险时,由于破产清算价值低,金融中介缺乏足够的动力让其破产;在不完全契约中,中小企业隐瞒信息的偏好使金融中介的破产威胁不能有效防范战略性违约。由此引申出解决中小企业融资难的政策建议。

The difficult problem of SMEs' financing is analyzed qualitatively by considering the characteristics of the debt contract between SMEs and financial intermediaries.A simple model is exploited to quantitatively research into both behaviors and dynamic laws of debt financing.The conclusion is drawn that difficulties of SMEs' financing is closely related to the value and the probability of liquidation.Moreover,the value and the probability of liquidation are decided by the characteristics of the debt contract.It is reliance of SMEs' performance on SMEs' enterpriser and complementarity of assets that lower the value of liquidation.Furthermore,financial intermediaries have little incentive to liquidate assets of SMEs considering the decreasing value of liquidation.In an incompleted debt contract,the threat of bankruptcy does not efficiently prevent SMEs from defaulting strategically due to SMEs' preference of hiding information.Some suggestions have also been given for the solution of SMEs' financing.