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商业银行经理人激励约束机制的博弈研究

Gaming study of Incentive and Restrictive Mechanism of Managers in Commercial Banks
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摘要 人力资源管理中的一个重要问题是信息不对称、信息不完全,而博弈论正是研究信息不对称问题的有力工具。本文运用博弈论方法及模型分析,认为要提高商业银行的长期经营绩效,必须将经营者(经理人)的收入水平与银行的长期经营业绩挂钩,降低与经营业绩无关的固定收入比重,提高与经营业绩相关收入的比重。商业银行应根据经营者的特点选择合适的激励水平和激励方式。 One of the key problems in HR man'sgement is asymmetric and incomplete information, for which game theory is an effective research tool. This article with the help of game theory and model analysis concludes that, in order to enhance their long - term operation performance, commercial banks have to link the managers'income with the banks'long -term business performance, reduce the proportions of fixed income unrelated to business performance and increase the proportions of the income related to business performance. Commercial banks shall choose appropriate incentive means and methods in line with their own characteristics.
出处 《河北经贸大学学报(综合版)》 2006年第2期51-55,共5页 Journal of Hebei University of Economics and Business(Comprehensive Edition)
关键词 商业银行 经营业绩 经理人 激励约束机制 收入 commercial banks business performance managers incentive and restrictive mechanism income
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