摘要
一般认为,一个银行服务质量的最优水平主要取决于它所在市场的市场结构、银行之间需求相互影响的程度以及竞争者对服务创新的模仿难易程度。然而,在并不严格的假设条件下,该模型对我国银行业市场结构动态演化过程中银行服务质量水平变化的解释能力较弱。究其原因,产权结构的天然缺陷导致银行在服务质量水平的决策方面缺乏内在激励。国内银行业服务质量水平阶段性的差异表明:产权制度是国内银行业提高服务质量、提高竞争绩效的决定性力量;学习能力是银行业提高服务质量、改善绩效的重要因素;人力资源是服务质量提高的基础性保证。
The optimal level of a bank’s service quality is mainly decided by the competitive structure of the market in which the bank operates, the degree of demand interaction between banks, and the difficulty of imitation of competitors’ service quality innovations. However, because of the inherent defects in the property right structure of the banking industry, the model provides weak explanation to the change in service quality level during the evolving process of the market structure in China. The difference in...
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2009年第5期35-38,共4页
Economic Survey
关键词
动态博弈
服务质量水平
学习能力
dynamic game
service quality
the ability of learning