可转债在管理者激励中作用的研究综述

Reviews on the Research of the Role of Convertible Bonds in Managerial Incentives

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摘要通过对从管理者在投资决策中的机会主义行为、堑壕保护以及努力水平3个方面的国内外相关研究成果进行了梳理和分析,并对可转债在中国转型经济环境下的特有应用价值和研究潜力,以及对现有研究的不足和未来研究的方向进行了简要评述.

作者罗进辉徐细雄万迪昉

机构地区西安交通大学管理学院

出处《管理学报》 2007年第z1期1-5,共5页 Chinese Journal of Management

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572039)

关键词可转换债券管理者激励过度投资投资不足综述

参考文献24

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管理学报

2007年第z1期

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