基于不对称信息的代理人私下交易及管制

Collusion of Agents and Its Control under Asymmetric Information

应用博弈论和信息经济学,研究了多代理人和信息不对称的条件下代理人是否订立私下合约对委托人激励机制的影响.指出如果代理人没有私下交易,委托人利用代理人之间的绩效比较可以有效地提高对代理人的激励;反之,代理人之间的私下交易则会削弱委托人对代理人的激励.而且,委托人如果能够观察并限制代理人间的私下交易,委托人的境况将得以改善.

By applying the game theory and the information economics, the effects of collusion on the incentive mechanism from a principal under the conditions of multi-agent and asymmetric information were investigated. It was pointed out that if there is no collusion among agents, a principal may raise the incentive by comparing their performances, nevertheless, the existence of collusion will weaken the incentive effect. In addition, if a principal can detect and restrict the collusion, its situation can be improved.