摘要
：Three generic forms of governance--hierarchy, hybrid and market are proposed in the newinstitutional economics, giving an abstract description of alternative coordination and control mechanisms forgeneral use. While this theory is known as far away from being operational and specified, a few researchersin the management and organization area are trying to extend Galbraith and/or Mintzberg's organizationaldesign theories into the application of logistical coordination for obtaining a smooth flow of products along thesupply chain within and without the focal organization. In this paper, we present an explorative case study onthe design of various organizational architectures of logistics activities and their relevant coordinationmechanisms, especially internal and external contracts as one new kind of hybrid mechanisms forcoordinating effective supply chains.
：Three generic forms of governance--hierarchy, hybrid and market are proposed in the newinstitutional economics, giving an abstract description of alternative coordination and control mechanisms forgeneral use. While this theory is known as far away from being operational and specified, a few researchersin the management and organization area are trying to extend Galbraith and/or Mintzberg's organizationaldesign theories into the application of logistical coordination for obtaining a smooth flow of products along thesupply chain within and without the focal organization. In this paper, we present an explorative case study onthe design of various organizational architectures of logistics activities and their relevant coordinationmechanisms, especially internal and external contracts as one new kind of hybrid mechanisms forcoordinating effective supply chains.
