摘要
本文采用了制度经济学中社会规范分析方法,引入羞辱函数对借款联盟形成与规模的确定进行了建模,证实信贷是如何在劣势借款者中间被配置的,社会规范的发展使得借款联盟对正式放贷者银行更有吸引力。
In order to analyze decision on group lending and optional group size, this article makes use of social norm approaches adopted on institutional economy ,and inducts the shame function to the model of credit rationing by developing a pattern. Then we examine how formal credit money would be rationed among inferior borrowers. It is more attractive than the evolution of social norms appealing to formal lenders.
基金
浙江省社科联基金重点资助项目(03z11)
关键词
劣势借贷者
信贷配给
借款联盟
制度分析
inferior borrowers
credit rationing
group lending
institutional analysis
