会计师事务所与被审计企业、政府的信誉机制动态博弈分析
被引量：1
摘要
本文运用完全信息动态博弈分析信誉机制对会计师事务所、被审计企业和政府的影响。通过建立会计师事务所与企业以及会计师事务所与政府之间的动态博弈模型,并分析模型均衡解时影响会计师事务所、被审计企业和政府不良行为概率的信誉因素,从而证明政府对会计师事务所进行监督的重要性,提出了治理被审计企业会计信息造假的对策。
出处
《财会月刊（中）》
2005年第11期22-24,共3页
finance and accounting monthly
参考文献1
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1张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M]上海三联书店,2004.
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