摘要
Dewatripont-Maskin(1995)将软预算约束描述为一种"事前无效,事后有效"的动态激励问题,认为信贷的分散化有助于消除软预算约束。文章在DM(1995)模型基础上引入控制权收益变量,论证了"事前无效,事后也无效"软预算约束的存在条件,指出这种软预算约束本质上是控制权人追求私人收益的道德风险行为。信贷的分散化不足以消除事后无效率的软预算约束。完善的公司治理机制和法律机制是减少事后无效率软预算约束的有效途径。
Dewatripont and Maskin(1995) described the SBC phenomena as an 'ex-ante inefficient,ex-post efficient' dynamic incentive problem and believed that decentralized credit could eliminate SBC effectively.The paper introduces the private benefit of control into DM model and analyzes the existence condition of SBC.It points out that this kind of SBC is essentially the moral hazard problem due to private benefit.Decentralized credit is not enough to eliminate SBC.We believe that perfect corporate governance and le...
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第5期123-132,共10页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70802038)
上海市哲学社会科学规划课题(2008EJB006)
关键词
软预算约束
控制权收益
事后无效
道德风险
soft budget constraint（SBC）
private benefit of control
ex-post inefficient
moral hazard
