摘要
在中央与地方关系的利益博弈中,地方政府拥有相对独立的发债权,意味着其必先拥有相对独立的财政自主权,而中央政府与地方政府和地方政府与地方人大的财政分权关系涉及纵向和横向权力制约的宪政命题。作为本地区公共利益的代表者和中央政府在地方的代言人,地方政府有着特殊的双重身份。从权力的法理属性来看,地方政府发债权具有公权力、地方权力和行政权力的属性特征。对地方政府发债权进行必要的规制和监督,成为了法治社会和宪政国家的应有之义。
In the interest relations between central and local governments,local governments have the relatively independent power of issuing bonds.It means that we must have a relatively independent power of financial autonomy firstly,and the power of fiscal decentralization involves to the vertical and horizontal power constraint of constitutional proposition between the central government and local governments,local governments and local people congresses.As the representative of region public interest and the cent...
出处
《黑龙江省政法管理干部学院学报》
2010年第5期4-8,共5页
Journal of Heilongjiang Administrative Cadre College of Politics and Law
关键词
地方政府发债权
公权力
地方权力
行政权力
Power of Local governments issue bonds
Public power
Local power
Executive power