关于股票期权激励理论与实践的思考

On the Theory and Practice of Stock Option Incentive

自1996年上海仪电控股(集团)公司在国内率先实行了股票期权制,上海和武汉等地的控股公司和上市公司纷纷对建立经营者股票期权制度进行了尝试和探索。本文主要讨论了股票期权制度的发展和理论基础,以及我国股票期权激励实施中存在的问题。经营者股票期权作为一种对管理层的激励机制,它的产生有两个理论来源:代理成本论和人力资本产权论。目前,我国股票期权激励实施中主要存在资本市场不完善、法律制度不健全、股权激励配套措施需改进等内外部原因。

Since Shanghai Electrical-Instrument-Making Company, the holding company(Group) took the lead in implementing the system of stock option at home since 1996, holding companies and listed companies in Shanghai and Wuhan have all made attempts and explored the system of operators' stock option, this article mainly discusses the development and theoretical foundation of this system as well as the existing problem is in implementing stock option incentive in China. As the incentive mechanism for managerial personnels, operators' stock option has two theoreticalsources--deputy cost theory and the theory of property right of human resources. At present, there mainly exist suchinterior and exterior problems as unhealthy capital market, defective legislation system and imperfect corresponding measures for incentives of stock right.