供应链企业间产品创新合作下的政府补贴策略

Governmental subsidy policy for firms' cooperative behavior in product innovation in supply chain

针对供应链产品创新合作的政府补贴问题,分别构建了在纳什博弈、斯坦克尔伯格博弈以及合作博弈三种不同的博弈关系下,政府对制造商和供应商合作研发投入进行补贴的博弈模型.分别分析了企业的最优研发投入和政府的最优补贴,并进一步分析了政府补贴行为和企业选择合作行为之间的互动博弈.研究结果表明,政府提供的补贴和企业的利润在企业合作博弈下最低,斯坦克尔伯格博弈下次之,纳什博弈下最高.同时,在政府选择补贴策略和供应链企业选择合作行为的博弈中,在企业能够自主选择合作行为的条件下,政府的最优策略是不实行补贴.

This paper studies the governmental subsidy policy in product innovation in supply chain.A game model,including a government,a manufacturer and a supplier,is set up to study the government s optimal policy and the firms optimal inputs and profits respectively under the conditions of Nash equilibrium,Stackelberg equilibrium and cooperative equilibrium.It is shown that the subsidies and the profits are descent in the order of Nash equilibrium,Stackelberg equilibrium and cooperative equilibrium,but the inputs...