摘要
有限的专利保护宽度使专利的商业价值同样会受到竞争的影响.针对各自拥有面向同一新兴市场但具有不同市场表现的专利技术的双寡头企业,构建投资时机选择期权博弈模型并分析企业的专利商业化投资决策特征.结果表明,专利技术的非对称程度将决定双寡头企业在专利商业化投资时机选择博弈中的均衡类型.在一定参数条件下,非对称程度或优势企业的相对优势呈由小到大变化时,博弈所产生的均衡类型将相应地表现为同时投资均衡、占先均衡和顺序投资均衡.
Limited patent protection breadth makes patent commercial value influenced by competition.Aimed at the duopoly enterprises with the patent facing the same new emerging market and having different market performances,this paper establishes an investment timing decision-making option game model and analyzes the decision feature of enterprise patent commercialization investment.The results show that the dissymmetry degree of patent will decide equilibrium type of the duopoly enterprises in the game of patent c...
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第4期512-519,共8页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
教育部博士点基金资助项目(教技函[2004]164号)
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"资助项目(教技函[2005]35号)
关键词
专利商业化
非对称期权博弈
占先均衡
顺序投资均衡
同时投资均衡
patent commercialization
asymmetry option game
preemption equilibrium
sequential investment equilibrium
simultaneous investment equilibrium