期刊文献+

基于拍卖机制的网络带宽分配问题研究

Network bandwidth allocation based on auction mechanism
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摘要 现存网络中存在着大量自私的用户,由于它们追求自身收益的最大化而造成了网络资源分配的不合理.基于VCG拍卖机制,提出了一种仅需一维竞价信息的网络资源分配机制,分析证明了该机制具有占优策略激励兼容的特性,进一步证明该机制纯的纳什均衡解存在且唯一.在此基础上,给出了指导用户进行策略选择的离散随机式学习算法.不同条件下的仿真表明,该算法能够正确地引导用户选择出占优策略,使得收益值达到最优. There exist many selfish users in the existing network.The fact that they always try to maximize their own social welfare causes the unfair resource allocation problem.In order to solve this problem,a new algorithm based on VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) auction mechanism is proposed,which needs only one dimension information.The dominate strategy incentive compatible property of the mechanism is proven,and the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution are proven as well.Based on this,a discrete...
出处 《系统工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2010年第4期526-532,共7页 Journal of Systems Engineering
基金 国家杰出青年基金资助项目(60525303) 国家自然科学基金资助项目(60604004 60804030 60974123) 河北省科技支撑配套项目(072435155D) 河北省教育厅基金资助项目(2008147) 燕山大学博士基金资助项目(B286)
关键词 网络资源分配 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) 激励兼容 随机式学习算法 network resource allocation Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG) incentive compatible stochastic learning algorithm
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参考文献11

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