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机构投资者参与国有企业公司治理积极性的分析

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摘要 机构投资者持股国有企业的比例不断增加,出于对自身整体绩效的考虑而较愿意在企业的公司治理中发挥其股东的"参政议政"作用。不同的机构投资者作为不同的产权主体介入国有企业的公司治理,能够使股权多元化,多方共同博弈,在博弈中达到动态均衡。
作者 王志刚
出处 《中共郑州市委党校学报》 2008年第4期54-55,共2页 Journal of the Party School of CPC Zhengzhou Municipal Committee
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