考虑信息粘性和正外部性的服务合作生产激励机制

Service Co-Production Incentive Mechanism with Information Stickiness and Positive Externalities

知识密集型服务是客户与供应商合作生产的系统,双方信息粘性大小和正合作外部性强度影响激励机制的设计。模型综合考虑信息粘性成本对互补型服务合作生产控制权结构及定价机制的影响。研究结果表明,信息粘性导致了契约不完全性及服务效率的下降;双方信息粘性总成本及合作正外部性强度决定着剩余控制权结构;剩余控制权结构、信息粘性总成本及合作正外部性强度共同影响合作服务的定价。

The co-production processes of knowledge-intensive services across client and provider organizations have costly information stickiness as well as positive externalities,and they would result in impacts on the design of incentive mechanism.We model the implications and find that information stickiness is linked to the loss of service efficiency and contributes to contract incompleteness;both the total information stickiness expenditures of each side and their positive externalities determine the residual right allocation;residual right,information stickiness and positive externalities jointly have impacts on pricing of service co-production.