法官的选择性司法行为——以环境侵权诉讼中的司法鉴定为例

The Selective Judicial Behavior——Taking the judicial appraisal in the environmental tort litigation as an example

系列案例研究汇同社会学调查数据表明,在我国环境侵权诉讼过程中,部分法官具有鲜明的排斥自由裁量权的合理运用,转而求助于鉴定结论补强判决合法性的倾向。学术界一般认为,由于法官自由裁量权而产生的选择性司法行为不具备组织性与规律性的特点,其影响是局部的,因此,这一领域的理论研究对法官的选择性司法行为并未给予充分的重视。运用法官效用函数的分析框架,借助博弈论的基本方法,可以从一个新的角度解读此种选择性司法倾向产生的原因,并分析当前几乎形成公论的改革建议存在的潜在风险。

Sociological surveys show that in the course of environmental tort litigation,some judges have a clear tendency to reject the rational use of discretion,but depend on the appraisal to reinforce the legitimacy of decisions.It is generally believed that the selective judicial behavior,which is caused by judges' discretion,is not organizational or with regularity characteristics and the impact is limited.Taking the Utility Function of judges as an analytical tool,with the basic methods of game theory,a new perspective of interpretation for such tendencies is put forward in the paper.It can also call attention to the popular proposer of formation the existence of potential risk.