上市公司财务舞弊与外部审计的博弈分析——基于不完全信息动态博弈模型

A Game Analysis on Financial Fraud of Listed Companies and External Auditing:A Dynamic Game Model with Incomplete Information

基于一系列基本假设,构建关于上市公司管理者财务舞弊与注册会计师外部审计的不完全信息动态博弈模型。通过对该博弈模型均衡结果的讨论,分析公司管理者和审计师的最优策略以及博弈模型多期重复进行的可能结果,进而提出减少财务舞弊发生的措施和建议。

This article constructs a dynamic game model for corporate financial fraud and external auditing on the basis of a series of fundamental assumptions.Through the discussion of the equilibrium results,it analyzed the optimal strategies for both corporate managers and external auditors,also the possible results of the repeated games.Finally,suggestions are proposed on how to reduce the occurrence of financial frauds.