事务所变更、信息隐藏及市场反应

Auditor Switching,Hidden Information and Market Reaction

采用事件研究法,利用2004—2011年我国A股上市公司会计师事务所变更数据,对事务所变更信息披露选择中存在的隐藏信息行为及由该行为所引起的市场反应进行实证分析。结果显示:对变更事项进行专项公告披露的公司比非专项公告披露的公司更易产生较差的市场反应;在专项公告披露的公司中,是否披露变更的具体原因及变更类型会导致市场反应的差异;然而,对于承载着特殊信息含量的换"所"不换"师"变更,投资者却未给予充分的关注。

Based on the sample of auditor switching during 2004—2011 in China capital market,we adopt the event study method to analyze the information hidden behaviour and relevant market reaction in the information disclosure choices by the company's management.The results indicate that the market reaction(CAR) of which information disclosed through the special announcement is relatively worse compared with the non-special announcement,and focusing on the sample of special announcement,the market reaction is influenced by various reasons for change,and is especially sensitive to the bad signal.However,the phenomenon CPA's job-hopping which carries specific signals fails to catch the attention of investors.Furthermore,the results above are robust after removing the noise of significant events surrounding the event date and so on.