大型工程设计咨询审查中的合谋行为及审计策略

Collusive Behavior and Audit Mechanism of Large Scale Construction Designing and Consulting

工程设计质量好坏不仅决定工程的使用功能,而且从根本上影响工程建设的进度、成本和质量等目标的实现。在业主与参建单位信息不对称的情况下,设计单位往往与审查咨询单位合谋来实现自身经济利益最大化。通过分析大型工程设计咨询审查过程中设计单位和审查咨询单位的合谋行为,建立双方的合谋博弈模型,进而探讨合谋形成的条件。重点研究审计机构、设计单位和审查咨询单位三方博弈,并给出防范大型工程设计咨询审查合谋的审计策略。研究结果显示审计机构须通过提升审计成功概率、降低审计成本、加大对合谋主体惩罚力度等措施来降低设计咨询审查的合谋概率。

Construction designing quality not only determines the function of project,but also affects its progress,cost and quality fundamentally.For maximizing their economic interests,the design unit and consultation unit often conspire to get more design fees and reduce the design cost under asymmetric information.This paper analyses the stakeholders of the construction design and sets up the collusion game model between the design unit and the consultation unit to obtain the condition of the collusion.Then,this paper studies the manner and scope of design auditing on the base of trilateral game model of design units,consultation unit and audit machinery.The study results show that audit machinery can effectively reduce the design units and consultant unit collusion motivation by enhancing the supervision success rate,reducing monitoring costs,and increasing the punishment force.