股权激励导致过度投资吗?——来自中小板制造业上市公司的经验证据

Does Stock Option Plan Induce Over-Investment? Evidence from Listed Companies of Manufacturing on SME Board Market in China

以257家中小板制造业上市公司2005—2011年财务数据为样本,检验实行股权激励计划能否减少上市公司过度投资行为以及能否显著地降低经理人代理成本。研究发现,实行股权激励计划的中小板制造业上市公司相对来说更容易出现过度投资行为,其过度投资比例与自由现金流正相关;研究还发现,实行股权激励计划后并没有显著降低中小板上市公司的代理成本。

Based on the sample of 257 listed companies of manufacturing industry on small-and-medium enterprise(SME) board market from 2005 to 2011,we examine whether implementing stock option plan will reduce the chance of over-investment and magnitude of executives' agency cost.We prove that the SME listed companies with a stock option plan are more likely to over-invest and the proportion of over-investment will result in a positive collection with free cash flows,at the same time,we also find that no evidence proves SME listed companies with stock option plan reduce the agency cost significantly.