投资者异质性,审计师选择和信号传递:理论模型与政策分析

Investor Heterogeneity, Auditor Selection and Signaling: Theoretical Model and Policy Analysis

本文发展了一个存在投资者异质性的理论框架,来讨论上市公司选聘审计师的决策。我们发现:首先,审计师的选择具有信息传递功能。其次,市场上知情投资者比例越大,公司对高质量审计师的需求就越高,市场平均审计质量就越高,反之亦然。我们最后还发现,提高整个市场的审计精度,能强化审计师选择的信息传递功能;而如果政府加大对不清洁意见的惩罚,会让所有公司都有更强的动机去选低独立性的审计师。

This paper developed a theoretical framework with investor heterogeneity to discuss auditor selection by firms. The results show that the choice of auditor can transmit information. The higher proportion of informed investors in the market, the demands for auditors are higher, the market average audit quality is higher, and vice versa. The signaling function of auditor selection can be enhanced by improving the audit precision of the whole market. If governments increasing the punishment on foul opinions, all firms will be likely to choose the auditors with low independence.