博弈论视阈下的自愿性环保投资与回应型规制

The Voluntary Environmental Investment and Responsive Regulation from a Perspective of Game Theory

在我国全面建设小康社会的关键时期,面对环境污染的严重形势,必须高度重视环境保护,提高规制者的规制效率,促进企业的环保投资。文章通过设立一个两阶段博弈模型,考察企业实施自愿性环保投资的动机、投资所产生的福利后果以及规制者在自愿性投资中所发挥的作用。研究发现,在设定规制策略的时候,如果规制者以斯坦克尔伯格模型中尾随企业的行为方式行动,即实施回应型规制,企业的自愿性投资将会明显地增加。同时,为了使环保投资处于社会期望的水平,规制者还需要调整针对违规企业的处罚结构,而且,为了更好地实现规制者与被规制企业之间的互动,还需要构建健全的信息机制。

In the critical period of building a moderately prosperous society in our country,and facing the serious situation of environmental pollution,great importance must be attached to environmental protection to improve regulation efficiency and to promote environmental investment.We use a simple game model to study the voluntary environmental incentive,the welfare consequences of the voluntary investment and the role the regulators play in environmental protection investment.It is found that if the regulators implement responsive regulation in setting regulatory strategy,the voluntary investment will be significantly increased.Meanwhile,in order to make environmental protection investment at the level of the social expectations,the regulators need to adjust the structure of penalties for illegal enterprises.Moreover,in order to achieve better regulation by the regulatory interaction between enterprises,we need to build a sound mechanism.