地方政府竞争与中国的区域市场整合机制——中国式分权框架下的地区专业化研究

Local Government Competition and the Mechanism of Regional Market Integration in China:Regional Specialization under the Framework of Decentralization with Chinese Characteristics

市场化是我国30多年来渐进式改革实践的基本取向,而政府行为在市场化演进中的作用却是理论界聚讼不休的焦点问题。中国式分权背景下,政府行为在中国经济市场化演进中的作用机理及其逻辑框架为:由财政分权和政治集权驱动的我国地方政府竞争,对区域间的市场整合具有双刃效应。利用Krugman专业化指数计算全国30个省1999-2010年的地区专业化水平,在控制了各种变量之后,使用GMM方法考察地方政府竞争对地区专业化的影响。研究发现,地方政府行为中旨在促进要素自由流动的积极竞争(即顺市场力量)促进了地区专业化,而地方保护主义等消极竞争导致地区逐渐封闭并形成大而全的产业体系。此外,还发现地方政府竞争对地区专业化的影响具有区域差异效应和跨时效应。

The market-oriented economy has been the ultimate goal of the progressive reform practice in the past three decades in China.The role of the government has played in the evolution of the market-oriented economy has been one of the most controversial issues in the theoretical circles.In the context of Chinese decentralization style,this paper explores the mechanism of the government behavior and its logical framework in the evolution of the market economy in China.It argues that local government competition in China,driven by fiscal decentralization and political centralization,is a double-edged sword for inter-regional market integration.The paper uses the Krugman specialization index to calculate the level of regional specialization in the country's 30 provinces from 1999 to 2010 and further applies the GMM methods to examining the impact of the local government competition on regional specialization,after controlling for a variety of variables.It is found that positive behavior of the local government aiming to promote the free flow of factors(i.e.,the cis-market forces)could promote regional specialization while vicious competition such as local protectionism would result in closed regional economy and encourage a comprehensive and large industrial system.In addition,our findings suggest that the impact of the local government competition on regional specialization differs with regions and periods.