证券分析师关注与审计监督:替代抑或互补效应——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

Securities Analysts' Watch and Audit Supervision: Substitution or Complementary Effect: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Private Listed Companies

作为公司外部治理的重要力量之一,证券分析师会对审计监督产生一定的影响。以2001—2010年沪深两市A股民营上市公司为研究样本,分别采用审计意见和会计盈余稳健性作为衡量审计监督质量的替代指标,实证考察证券分析师关注与审计监督之间的关系。研究发现,证券分析师关注与民营上市公司的审计监督质量负相关,表明证券分析师关注与外部审计监督之间存在替代效应。

As one of the important strengths of external corporate governance,securities analysts have some influence on audit supervision. Using A-share private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2010 as a sample,this article empirically investigates the relationship between securities analysts' watch and audit quality from the perspective of audit opinions and accounting conservatism. The results show that securities analysts' watch significantly reduces audit supervision quality and there is a substitution effect between them.