中国省级官员晋升与辖区增长绩效——基于政治网络强度的经验判断

Chinese Provincial Officials' Promotion and Local Economic Performance: Based on the Experience Judgment of Political Network Intensity

现有关于官员晋升效应的文献只是考察了晋升与增长之间的相关关系,而相对忽略了对两者相关关系存在条件的分析。本文将中共中央委员会候补委员晋升为正式委员的样本视为考察省级官员晋升效应的自然实验,通过构造面板数据并采用倍差法重新检验了省级官员晋升是否对辖区经济增长具有显著性影响。结论是,省级官员在政治晋升激励下作出致力于辖区经济增长的反应会因官员的政治网络强度而异。同时,那些政治网络程度较强的样本官员相对于政治网络程度较弱的样本官员给地方经济带来的正向经济刺激要较差。

The existing literatures researching about the promotion effect of Chinese provincial officers only examine the correlation between the promotion and economic growth,but neglect the analysis of the existence condition of the correlation.This paper regarded the case that the alternate member of the CPC Central Committee became full member of the Committee as a natural experiment.The correlation between Chinese provincial officers' promotion and local economic performance was inspected by constructing the panel data and using difference-in-differences estimation.The conclusion is that the provincial officials' promotion incentive to make the commitment to local economic growth changes with their political network intensity.Meanwhile,when a provincial official's political network is stronger than others,his promotion effect to the short-term economic growth rate is less on the contrary.This paper gave some preliminary interpretations for this situation.