摘要
这篇文章提供了一个关于法经济学分析如何通过增加对真实人类行为的关注而提高的广阔视野。这篇文章的目的是通过引入一种更准确地理解了人类行为及其原因的选择观,提出法经济学分析的一个新方法。行为经济学与传统模型比起来,似乎更能预测和解释那些协商失败而交由仲裁者终结的谈判。在这篇文章中,作者指出有限理性,尤其是禀赋效应,对传统的法经济学主张提出了质疑。作者用行为经济学解释法律内容的机制是简易、传统的,是对先前许多关于事后偏见研究的直接推测。事后偏见在侵权法制度中似乎根深蒂固,以至于人们即使唤起法官对它的注意,法官(更不用说陪审员)可能也难于承认或者解决事后偏见。
This article offers a broad vision of how law and economics analysis may be improved by increased attention to insights about actual human behavior. The goal in this article is to advance an approach to the economic analysis of law that is informed by a more accurate conception of choice,one that reflects a better understanding of human behavior and its wellsprings.Behavioral economics appears more likely than the conventional model to predict and account for those negotiations that fail and end up in the hands of an arbitrator.In this article,the authors suggest that bounded rationality,in particular the endowment effect,casts doubt on the con- ventional law and economics claim.The mechanisms underlying their behavioral e- conomic account of the content of law are simple and conventional.This is a straightforward prediction of the many prior studies on hindsight bias.Hindsight bias seems to be so deeply ingrained in the tort system that even when it is called to a court's attention,it may be difficult for the court(never mind a juror)to recognize or address it.
出处
《北大法律评论》
2005年第1期460-497,共38页
Peking University Law Review